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SOUTH .DAKOTA V. BROWN.' 1 JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF
GOVERNOR'S DUTY TO EXTRADITE FUGITIVES

In December 1976, the State of South Dakota petitioned the California Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel Governor
Edmund Brown, Jr. to extradite a convicted fugitive from South Dakota. In South .Dakota v. Brown, the court denied that petition and
held that the gubernatorial duty to extradite a convicted felon and fugitive from a sister state was incapable of judicial enforcement. The
court, adopting a tone of judicial self-restraint, only peripherally examined the constitutional separation of powers question actually resolved in the case. In its central line of analysis, the court instead
embarked on an ill-conceived construction of the statute in question,
the California Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.Z By framing the issue of judicial enforcement as exclusively one of statutory interpretation, the court departed from established California precedent
requiring the issuance of mandamus to the executive branch in appropriate cases.
This Note focuses on the Brown court's analysis of the issue of
state COJ.Irt enforcement of the gubernatorial extradition duty imposed
by the Extradition Act. It examines the court's construction of the Act,
as well as the court's lnitial decision to frame the basic question addressed as solely one of statutory interpretation. The conclusion
reached is that the Brown court's analysis is a product of result-oriented
judicial reasoning. This Note does not address the court's handling of
enforcement of the federally imposed duty 3 nor the theoretical justifications for gubernatorial discretion in extradition of interstate fugitives.
The facts of the case are straightforward. After a jury trial in the
Seventh· Judicial Circuit of South Dakota on July 25th and 26th of
1975, Dennis Banks was convicted of riot while armed with a dangerous weapon and assault with a dangerous weapon without intent to
1. 20 Cal. 3d 765, 576 P.2d 473, 144 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1978) (Richardson, J.) (5-l decision).
The supreme court, reversing a unanimous court of appeal, denied South Dakota's petition for a
writ of mandamus to compel the governor to extradite Dennis Banks and discharged the writ
issued by the court of appeal in South Dakota v. Brown, 138 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1977). South Dakota
applied directly to the California Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus. The supreme court
transferred the petition to the Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District.
2. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1547-1558 (West 1970) (hereinafter referred to in the text as the
Extradition Act).
3. In concluding that the federally imposed extradition duty is not enforceable by a California court, the Brown court relied heavily on Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66 (1861), and In re
Manchester, 5 Cal. 237 (1855). Much of this Note's criticism of the court's unsound reliance upon
these two cases in the context of the state imposed duty is also relevant to the court's analysis of
the federal context. See text accompanying notes 13-36 infta.
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kill. 4 On July 26, Banlcs posted bond. He was released on bail, agreeing not to travel outside South Dakota and to return for sentencing on
August 5, 1975. When Banks failed to appear on the scheduled date, a
bench warrant was issued for his arrest. Banlcs was later seized in California. In February of 1976, the Governor of South Dakota presented
Governor Brown of California with a demand for Banlc's extradition.
The State of South Dakota responded to Brown's subsequent inaction
with a petition to the California Supreme Court on December 28, 1976,
for a writ of mandamus to compel extradition. When the supreme
court announced its decision on March 20, 1978, Governor Brown had
yet to act on the demand. Though the supreme court denied the petition to compel extradition, it noted that a writ of mandamus could be
issued ordering the governor to exercise his discretion. Subsequently,
Governor Brown declared his refusal to extradite Banks.
I
THE OPINION

The duty of a California governor to extradite fugitives from sister
states is derived from two sources: the federal Constitution, 5 together
with its implementing legislation, and California's Extradition Act
The court began its analysis with an examination of the federal provisions. After briefly reviewing United States Supreme Court6 and California Supreme Court7 authorities which have characterized the duty
imposed by the federal Constitution as "mandatory," the opinion concluded that as a matter of established federal and California law, the
federal duty to extradite is unenforceable by either federal or California state courts. lln support of tills conclusion, Justice Richardson cited
cases 8 which purportedly reached a similar result. Further, he argued
4. S.D. COiviPILED LAWS ANN.§ 22-i0-5 (aggravated riot) and§ 22-i8-i.l(2) (aggravated
assault). These sections in their present form are part of the 1976 revisions to the South Dakota
Criminal Code. The relevant Code sections in force at the time Dennis Banks was tried and
convicted were the prerevision versions of§ 22-10-5 (riot while aTITJed) and§ 22-18-11 (assault
without intent to kill but with intent to injure) which were repealed as part of the 1976 revision.
5. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. Acting upon an opinion by Attorney General Randolph
that the extradition clause was not self-executing, the United States Congress in 1793 passed implementing legislation which is found in its current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3195 (1969). A
brief history of this legislation is contained in the Commissioners' Prefatory Note, UNIFORM
CRiiviiNAL EXTRADITION ACT [ll U.L.A. 52 (West 1974)).
6. Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 22 (1906); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66
(1861).
7. In re Russell, 12 Cal. 3d 229, 524 P.2d 1295, I 15 Cal. Rptr. 51 I (1974).
8. The federal cases cited were: Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366 (1872); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66 (1861). Cited as authority from state courts were: In re Manchester, 5 Cal. 237
(1855); People v. Millspaw, 257 App. Div. 40, 12 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1939), m''d on ot!Jer grounds, 281
N.Y. 441, 24 N.E.2d I 17 (1939); Carpenter v. Lord, 88 Or. 128, 171 P. 577 (1918); Ex parle Waliace, 38 Wash. 2d 67, 227 P.2d 737 (1951).
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that the absence of specific enforcement procedures in both the extradition clause of the United States Constitution and its implementing legislation necessarily precluded enforcement of the federal duty in
Brown.
After disposing of the federal duty on enforceability grounds, the
court considered the duty imposed upon the governor by the Extradition Act. Primarily on the basis of a lengthy interpretation of the Act,
the court concluded that there was no evidence that the present statute,
or its precursors, authorized judicial enforcement of the governor's extradition duty. Two elements dominated this interpretational analysis:
(I) an examination of the source and historical development of the
state's first extradition statute, which was enacted in 1851; and (2) a
survey of what the court termed the "general tenor" of the various provisions of the present Extradition Act. The court buttressed its conclusion that the Act creates no judicially enforceable gubernatorial duty to
extradite with the observation that this interpretation accords with the
practices of the last five California governors, and is supported by considerations of public policy. Finally, the majority concluded that while
the court could not compel the governor to extradite, it could require
some gubernatorial action within a reasonable time.
Since the court focused its inquif'j upon a two-pronged examination of the Extradition Act, the elements of that analysis merit careful
consideration in evaluating the Brown opinion as a whole.
II
THE LANGUAGE OF THE CALIFORNIA EXTRADITION ACT

To support its construction of legislative intent, the Brown majority relied principally upon the language of Ca11forn1a's current Extradition Act. Like its precursors, it conforms closely to the wording of the
extradition clause of the United States Constitution. 9 After the adoption in 1851 of the federal language as part of California's first extradi9. Section 1549.2 of the current California Uniform Criminal Extradition Act reads:
If a dema.n,d conforms to the provisions of this chapter, the Governor or agent authorized
in writing by the Governor whose authorization has been filed with the Secretary of
State shall sign a warrant of arrest, which shall be sealed with the State Seal, and shall be
directed to any peace officer or other person whom he may entrust with the execution
thereof. The warrant must substantially recite the facts necessary to the validity of its
issuance.
CAL. PENAL CoDE§ 1549.2 (West 1970). The extradition clause of the United States Constitution
provides:
A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or oth.er Crime, who shall flee from
Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of
the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
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tion statute, the federal extradition dause was interpreted as incapable
of judicial enforcement against a state governor, despite its ostensibly
mandatory nature. 10 'fhe Brown court argued that since the California
legislature did not materially alter the statute's language following announcement of these decisions, the limitations grafted by the courts
onto the federal extradition clause must have been intended by the legislature to be incorporated in the Cal!fomia statute and its successors.
In concluding that the language of the statute had not been materially altered, the court was unimpressed by the adjustments which the
legislature did in fact make in the wording of the Extradition Act, distinguishing it from the federal model. In adopting the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act in 1937, the legislature modified the Uniform Act
by changing "if the Governor decides that the demand should be complied with, he shall sign a warrant of arrest" 11 to "[i]f a demand conforms to the provisions of Hils chapter, the Governor . . . shall sign a
warrant of arrest." 12 Nonetheless, the .Brown court concluded that the
legislature, in enacting the Extradition Act, :intended a discretionary
rather than mandatory gubernatorial obligation to extradite fugitives
from other states. 'fo arrive at this result, the court misused two authorities.
A.

The Court's Reliance on Kentucky v. Dennison

'fhe first case that the .Brown court misused was KentuckJ' v. .Dennison, 13 which held that a federal court could not issue mandamus to
compel extradition by a state governor. 14 'fen years prior to Dennison,
California had adopted its original extradition statute, 15 which cast the
gubernatorial duty in language essentially conforming to the federal
extradition clause. 16 'fhe .Brown court reasoned that the California legislature's failure, subsequent to DerttztSorz, to alter the language of the
lH'vtr"JJr1!~t1n.n
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same limitation on the Ca!!fomia judiciary that .Dennison had imposed
10. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66 (!961); Taylor v. Tainter, 83 U.S. 366 (1872).
I L UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION ACT§ 7 [II U.L.A. 180 (V/est 1974)].
12. CAL PENAL CODE§ 1549.2 (West !970).
13. 65 U.S. 66 (1861).
14. Id. at 107-10.
15. Ch. 29, § 665, 1851 Cal. Stats. 286.
16. As enacted in 1851, prior to either the Dennison or ManciJester decisions, the California
statute repeated the terms of the federal extradition clause with only minor changes:
A person charged in any State or Territory if tile United Stales, with treason, felony, or
other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in tflis State, shall on demand of
the executive authority of the State or Terrilor)' from which he fled, be delivered up b)'
il1e Govemor if t!Jis Stale, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime.
Ch. 29, § 665, 185 I Cal. Stats. 286 (italics indicate words not found in the federal extradition
clause). The apparent import of this language is the imposition of a mandatory duty. See cases
cited at notes 6 & 7 supra and note 38 i1![ra.
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on federal courts. Such an implication, however, is not reasonable in
light of the scope of the Dennison decision.
In Dennison, the State of Kentucky sought a writ of mandamus to
compel the Governor of Ohio to extradite a fugitive from Kentucky
charged with the crime of inducing and assisting a runaway slave. The
Governor of Ohio had refused extradition on grounds that the crime
charged was neither a crime in Ohio nor an offense "already known to
the common law and to the usage of nations." 17 Chief Justice Taney,
writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, denied the writ in spite of the
language of the Act of 1793-the federal statute implementing the extradition clause-stating that "it shall be the duty of the executive ·authority of the state . . . to cause the fugitive to be delivered." 18 In
assessing this language, Taney specifically noted that the terms used
would nornially create a mandatory and enforceable duty. He interpreted the legislative phrase "it shall be the duty" to "imply the assertion of the power to command and to coerce obedience." 19 Taney then
reached the extraordinary conclusion, however, that Congress, motivated by federalist concerns, had intended these words in the Act of
1793 to be merely "declaratory" of "moral duty." 20
Whatever the modern opinion about the scope and wisdom of
Dennison,Z 1 the decision cannot provide the Brown court with a legitimate tool for turning California legislative inaction22 into an endorsement of state court inability to compel state executive compliance with
an extradition demand. Dennison concerns the power of a federal court
to compel state action. The case was argued and decided on the eve of
the Civil War, in the midst of the secessionist controversy over states'
rights and slavery. Concerns of federalism form a cornerstone of its
17. 65 U.S. at 99.
18. 1 Stat. 302 (1793) (emphasis added).
19. 65 U.S. at 107.
20. /d.
21. While .Dennison was reaffirmed eleven years later in unambivalent language, Taylor v.
Tainter, 83 U.S. 366, 370 (1872), a comment made in passing on Dennison by the United States
Supreme Court in Michigan v. Doran, 99 S. Ct. 530 (1978), indicates a measure of uncertainty as
to its present validity. ("Whatever the scope of discretion vested in the governor of an asylum
state, if. Kentucky v. Dennison . . . ." /d. at 535.) Also, as Justice Mosk pointed out in his
dissenting opinion in Brown, "[t]here is serious question whether the rigid federalism of Dennison
would be followed today when a constitutional issue is involved. The high court has not hesitated
to order state and local officials to comply with constitutionally required school desegregation."
20 Cal. 3d at 781 n.l, 576 P.2d at 484 n.l, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 769 n.l (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
22. The Brown court noted that, in altering the California extradition statute in 1872 and in
1937, the legislature did not explicitly refute .Dennison. Consequently, the court reasoned, the
statute should be interpreted as incorporating a limitation on state court enforcement similar to
that set forth in .l)ennison on federal court enforcement. 20 Cal. 3d at 771-74, 576 P.2d at 477-79,
144 Cal. Rptr. at 762-64.
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1ogic. 23 The lack of specific California legislative response to this decision should therefo:re be interpreted to indicate Dennison's irrelevance
to the issue of state judicial authority to compel state executive action.
Particularly in light of the well-established federal constitutional principle that questions of intrastate separation of powers are beyond the
reach of federal courts, 24 the Brown court's contrary understanding is
unreasonable.
The illogic of the inference of legislative intent regarding Dennison
drawn in Brown can be further demonstrated by noting Dennison's
treatment of the statutory language in the Act of 1793. The opinion
explicitly states that the language in question-"it shall be the duty"implied a power of compulsion when used in "ordinary legislation."
From the context, this appears to refer to legislation which does not
concern the balance of power between the federal and state governments. The court also noted that the word "duty" used in the Act of
1793 "points to the obligation of the State to carry it [the governor's
extradition duty] into execution"-an apparent concession to state government authority in the area of enforcement. In short, the Court in
Dennison clearly indicated that the source of its limitation on federal
court enforcement was the federal-state context and not the federal language itself. Thus, contrary to the inference drawn by the Brown majority, the Californ1a legislature would not reasonably have concluded
that the Dennison limitation was inherent in the federal language. No
specific :repudiation should have been necessary on the part of the legislature to avoid sanctioning the .Dennison limitation with its adoption
and retention of federal language.
The California Penal Code provides additional support for the argument against an inference of legislative intent to adopt the Dennison
limitationa _A._ principle of statutOij' construction codified in Penal Code
section 5 in 1872, and cited by the majority in Brown, states: "The
provisions of this Code, so far as they are substantially the same as
existing statutes, must be construed as continuations thereof, and not as
new enactments." 25 Because the language at issue in Brown was originally adopted -in 1851, well before the announcement of Dennison in
1860, and since the 1872 and 1937 extradition statutes were, as the
Brown court argues, 26 "substantially the same" as the 1851 statute in
their use of language taken from the federal Constitution, JPenal Code
23. The section of the case considering the mandamus question focused almost exclusively
on discussion of the states' rights aspect of the problem. The absence of an explicit enforcement
provision in the Act of 1793 was referred to in only a single sentence of the opinion. 65 U.S. at
107.
24. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., in U.S. 210 (1908).
25. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 5 (West 1970).
26. 20 Cal 3d at 774, 576 P.2d at 479, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 764.
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section 5 dictates that they be viewed for purposes of construction as
continuations ofthe 1851 statute. Clearly, the 1851 statute's use offeder.al language nine years prior to .Dennison can import no legislative
intent whatsoever in regard to .Dennison. Consequently, on the basis of
their perpetuation of the use of federal language, subsequent statutes
should be presumed neutral in relation to .Dennison.
R

The Court's Reliance on In re Manchester

The second case upon which the Brown majority relied was In re
Manchester. 27 The case was used both as authority for the proposition
that California courts cannot enforce the federal constitutional obligation to extradite, and to support the unenforceability of the apparently
mandatory terms of California's Extradition Act. The problems resulting from the court's misuse of Manchester are compounded by its contention that since post-Manchester legisla~ive amendments to the
Extradition Act did not seek to overturn the case, the state legislature
supported a discretionary rather than mandatory interpretation of the
governor's extradition responsibilities.
In re Manchester, however, is insufficient authority for the argument advanced by the Brown court. Written by Chief Justice Murray
in i 855, the opinion takes up scarcely two pages in the official California Reports. Furthermore, it only fleetingly addresses the proposition
which the Brown court considers central to this controversy. The key
language is:
It may be as well to state, in limine, that I do not consider, under the
distribution of powers by the Constitution of this State, the Judiciary
are denied jurisdiction in this class of cases (habeus review of imprisonment pursuant to extradition]. The very object ofhabeus corpus, was to
reach just such cases; and while the Courts if the State possess no power
to control the Executive discretion, and compel a surrender, yet, having
once acted, that discretion may be examined into, in every case where
the liberty of the subject is involved. 28
The Brown court's treatment of this isolated phrase as a bar to
enforcement of a state created extradition duty is unsound for a
27. 5 Cal. 237 (1855). In re Manchester dealt with a challenge under federal law to the
incarceration of a fugitive pursuant to a gubernatorial extradition warrant. The case held that the
court can examine the validity of the state chief executive's warrant of extradition under habeus
corpu& and that such a warrant may be supported by a requisition from a demanding state which:
(I) charges a crime but does not set forth the offense in the detail required by an indictment and
(2) states that the person sought committed a crime and then fled but does not use the words
"fugitive from justice." Id. at 238-39. The court also held that the demanding governor's certification was adequate authentication of the requisition and that the court would not look beyond
the governor's certification in judging the authenticity of the requisition and its supporting papers.
I d.
28. Id. at 238 (emphasis added).

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

650

[Vol. 67:643

number of reasons. First, the statement itself mistakes substaniive law.
If the italicized portion of the quote is recast in the form of a syllogism,
the major premise is that courts cannot control executive discretion, the
minor premise is that extradition is a discretionary duty, and the conclusion is that the courts therefore cannot compel extradition.
The major premise was by 1855 and remains today a commonplace principle under both the federaF 9 and California3 ° Constitutions.
Manchester's unstated but necessary minor premise, however, commands far less support. The .Brown court of appeal decision stated explicitly that Manchester was an exception to the uniform
characterization in California case law of the governor's extradition
duty as nondiscretionary; 31 the .Brown supreme court decision noted
that cases subsequent to Mandzester had characterized the duty as
mandatory. 32 The contention that this JWanchester premise is an erroneous characterization of both the federal and state imposed extradi3
tion obligations is supported by a long line of both· federaP and
California34 cases.
The Brown court itself recognized and retained the well-established mandatory characterization of this duty. 35 But having accepted
the dutv as- de iure mandatorv. the Brown court reasoned that the obligation was nonetheless unenforceable. This conclusion resulted in de
facto gubernatorial discretion in extradition matters; the reasoning in
Manchester, to the contrary, concluded that the duty was unenforceable because it was de jure discretionary. If the Manchester dictum
quoted above was an accurate statement of law, there would have been
no need for the Brown court's elaborate enforceability discussion, since
it is well established in California that de jure discretionary duties of
the governor are unenforceable by writ of mandamus. The Brown
court's extended search for erul:orcement authorization suggests that it
J

J

_,,

29. United States ex ref. Redfieid v. Windon, i37 U.S. 636 (l89i); Mississippi v. Johnson, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (!867); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
30. Jenkins v. Knight, 46 Cal.2d 220, 293 P.2d 6 (1956); People ex reL McCauley v. Brooks,
16 Cal. II (1860); People ex reL McDougall v. Bell, 4 Cal. 177 (1854). Just three years prior to
_Manchester, Chief Justice Murray in his opinion in Fowler v. Pierce, 2 Cal. 165 (1852), had identified the line between discretionary and mandatory executive duties as the constitutional line of
demarcation between those acts of its coordinate branch which the court could and could not
COIIlpeJ.
31. 138 Cal. Rptr. 14, 17 (3d Dist. 1977).
32. 20 Cal. 3d at 770, 576 P.2d at 476, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 761.
33. See cases cited at note 8 supra.
34. In re Russell, 12 Cal. 3d 229, 524 P.2d 1295, 115 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1974); In re Golden, 65
Cal. App. 3d 789, 135 Cal. Rptr. 512 (1977); In re Morgan, 244 Cal. App. 2d 903, 53 Cal. Rptr. 642
(1966).
35. "From all of the foregoing we conclude that . . . the federal Constitution imposes upon
the Governor a mandatory obligation to extradite a fugitive to a demanding state . . . ." 20 Cal.
3d at 771, 576 P.2d at 477, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 762.
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was not comfortable itself with Manchester's characterization of the gubernatorial duty.
The erroneous nature of this characterization, which formed the
minor premise of the syllogism outlined above, necessarily destroys the
force of that syllogism and thus invalidates the reasoning of the court in
Manchester concerning enforcement of the governor's extradition duty.
Consequently, the Brown court could not soundly rely on Manchester
as authority for a rule barring enforcement of extradition.
A secbnd difficulty with the Brown court's reliance on Manchester
stems from the ambiguity in the Manchester court's intended scope of
reference. It is unclear from Chief Justice Murray's opinion whether
his statement concerning judicial authority refers solely to the court's
lack of power to compel the federal obligation, or extends as well to the
California statutory obligation. As a general proposition concerning
judicial authority, it seems to refer to both. Only federal law was at
issue in the case, however, and the opinion never referred to the state
extradition statute enacted four years before. 36
Finally, it is noteworthy that the Manchester court's statement regarding judicial power of compulsion to extradite is dictum. The
power to compel was not at issue in Manchester, nor was it an essential
element of the two major issues presented: judicial authority under writ
of habeus corpus and the standard of sufficiency utilized to evaluate a
challenged warrant requisition.
For these reasons, the Brown court's reading of Manchester is both
precedentially and analytically inappropriate. The significance of this
misreading of Manchester is twofold. First, as noted earlier, the m~jor
ity's use of the case provided an essential step in its construction of the
Extradition Act. The court reasoned that if a rule barring enforcement
of a state-created duty had been clearly established by Manchester,
then the legislature's failure to indicate a purpose to depart from that
established rule in subsequent statutory enactments (ie., the enactments of the 1872 and 1937 extradition statutes) demonstrated intent to
maintain and incorporate the established rule. A close reading of
Manchester demonstrates, however, that no such inference should be
drawn from legislative silence. Moreover, a legislative purpose to
adopt a judicially enforceable right no longer appears to be a radical
departure from established law once Manchester's proper scope is understood. Thus, the Brown court's interpretation of the Extradition Act
is seriously flawed.
36.

Ch. 29, § 665, 1851 Cal. Stats. 286.
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THE "GENERAL TENOR" OF THE EXTRADITION AcT

lln the second phase of its two-pronged analysis, the Brown court
attempted! to demonstrate that the "general tenor" of the Extradition
Act provides for de jure executive discretion rather than judicially imposed mandatory performance. To this point in its analysis, the court
appeared to accept the traditional characterization of a de jure
mandatory, but nonetheless unenforceable, duty. 37 With its assessment
of the tenor of the Extradition Act, however, the court recharacterized,
without explanation, the duty as de jure discretionary. This characterization not only departs from established California precedent, 38 but
also raises supremacy clause questions of conflict with federal law
which has uniformly stipulated a mandatory duty. 39 The court,
though, may well have insulated its decision from this potential infiTmity by advancing the principle of state court enforcement authorization, which, as a matter of state separation of powers, is not a matter of
federal concem. 40 Finally, by neglecting to assess the range of possible
alternative readings of the admittedly ambiguous statute, the Brown
court failed to choose in a principled manner among alternative constructions of the Extradition Act A fair assessmeni of these alternatives would lilk:ely have led to an opposite conclusion on the issue of the
court's enforcement power.

Without doubt, a measure of statutory ambiguity is created by apparently conflicting provisions of the Extradition Act. On one hand,
section ]548.1 ("it is the duty of the Governor to have arrested and
deliver up" any requested fugitive) 41 and section 1549.2 ("[i]f a demand
conforms to the provisions of this chapter, the Governor . . . shall sign
a "vvarrant of arresf';7)42 appear to speak in clear mandatory tones. On
37. See note 35 supra. The distinction, whlch is admittedly a fine one, is hetwe~n de facto
discretion resulting from judicial unenforceability and unenforceability resulting from de jure discretion. In reviewing the Extradition Act, the CO]Jrt stated "[i]t is lilcely that the Legislature chose
to frame the obligation to e;ctradite in mandatory terms in order to avoid the appearance of inconsistency with prior federal and state law, a..TJd to emphasize the Governor's hlgh obligation to carry
out the extradition laws." Id. at 774, 576 P.2d al 479, 144 CaL Rptr. at 764. in dosing, the court
again noted that the extradition "duty may be considered mandatory in nature." /d. at 779, 576
P.2d at 482, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
38. See cases cited at note 34 st~vra.
39. See cases cited at note 6 supra.
40. See note 24 supra.
41. CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1548.1 (West 1970). The full text of§ 1548.1 reads;
Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the Constitution of the United States, and the
laws of the United States, it is the duty of the Governor of this State to have arrested and
delivered up to the executive authority of any other State any person charged in that
State with treason, felony, or other crime, who has lied from justice and is found in this
State.
42. !d. § !549.2. The full text of§ 1549.2 appears at note 9 supra.
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the other hand, section 1548.3 (granting gubernatorial investigatory
power to have reported "the situation and circumstances of the person
so demanded, and whether he ought to be surrendered according to the
provision of this chapter")43 arid section 1554 ("[t]he Governor may
recall his warrant of arrest or may issue another warrant whenever he
deems it proper")44 seem to allow discretionary executive action.
The Brown court resolved this conflict by concluding that the discretionary sections dominated the mand~tory provisions. This resolution rejected alternative interpretations offered by the State of South
Dakota. First, the court refused to limit section 1548.3 to authorizing
investigations of only the formal sufficiency of extradition papers, on
the ground that such a limitation would render the clauses "situation
and circumstances of the person" and whether he "ought to be surrendered" to be but "pure surplusage."45 Sitnilarly, the warrant revocation powers of section 1554 were found to have broader scope than
mere reference to situations where a Governor's warrant was either no
longer necessary or formally defective, since confining the clause in this
manner "strains the statutory language."46 Neither, argued the court,
should the authorization of the clause be confined to cases of extradition to California (thus excluding a governor's ability to revoke warrants extraditing.from the state), since this would make the sequential
placement of section 1554 within the Act "odd" and "unusual." 47 In
thus opting for a dominating discretionary tenor, the court found the
explicit grant of discretion in some other sections of the Act no barrier
to interpreting the ostensibly mandatory phrasing of sections 1548.1
and 1549.2 as judicially unenforceable; and hence de facto discretionary.
The court's justifications for rejecting South Dakota's alternative
interpretations are not analytically persuasive. First, a limitation of
section 1548.3 to authorize only investigations of formal extradition request sufficiency need not create any "pure surplusage." The language
of that section explicitly states that the investigation power granted
therein relates to the governor's duties throughout the chapter, which in
43. Id. § 1548.3. The full text of§ 1548.3 reads:
When a demand is made upon the Governor of this State by the executive authority of
another State for the surrender of a person so charged with crime, the Governor may call
upon the Attorney General or any district attorney in this State to investigate or assist in
investigating the demand, and to report to him the situation and circumstances of the
person so demanded, and whether he ought to be surrendered according to the provision
of this chapter.
44. Id. § 1554.
45. 20 Cal. 3d at 776, 576 P.2d at 480, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
46. Jd. at 775, 576 P.2d at 479, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 764.
47. Id. at 776, 576 P.2d at 480, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
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the «~amornia Penal Code constitutes the entire Extradition Act. 48
Moreover, section 1548.3 is the only section in the Act granting investigatory power. Within the Act, duties are imposed on the governor in
both mandatoif 9 and discretionary50 terms, varying with the factual
context of the demand. Consequently, since it is the only source of
investigatory power in the Act, section 1548.3 must provide a range of
investigatory power broad enough to cover the spectrum of investigations which could be invoked under the provisions of the chapter. Although section 1548.3 does not specify any limitations, it need not be
inferred that its entire :range of investigatory powers applies under
every p:wvision of the Act. Thus, the court could have interpreted the
discretionary language of section 1548.3 in a limited fashion, applicable
in the openly discretionary provisions of the Act. Such an interpretation would neither have slighted the mandatory language of sections
1548.1 and 1549.2 nor have rendered the language of section 1548.3
extraneous.
Second, in rejecting a procedural limitation upon the warrant revocation powers of section 1554 as straining the statutory language, the
court ignored the fact that all of the alternative constructions addressed
by the court would have stretched the statutory language to varying
degrees. Indeed, the rationale supplied by the court in making its
choice among interpretations seems disingenuous, given the fact that
the interpretation chosen by the court places a greater burden upon the
language of both sections 1548.1 and 1549.2 than the rejected altemative. The chosen construction-finding the mandatory language to be
discretionary--constitutes a substitution of judicial language for that
used by the legislature; it gives the words of both sections meanings
completely different from their normal legislative import. 51 The rejected construction of section 1554 on the other hand, would merely
have limited the language actually chosen by the legislature.
7
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statutory language is misinformed. Undermining this estimate is the
fact that fifteen other sections of the Act separate section 1554 from
section 1548.3, many of which are unrelated to the issuance or recall of
the governor's warrant to extradite a person from California. Additionally, the court failed to note that section 1554 immediately precedes
that section of the Act dealing with war:mnts demanding extradition to
48. /d. §§ 1547-1558.
49. I d. §§ 1548.1, 1549.2 (extradition of fugitives from another state).
50. I d. § 1549 (extradition of persons who did not leave demanding state voluntarily); id.
§ 1549.1 (extradition of persons not present in demanding state when crime occurred).
51. Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 556 P.2d 1101, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1976);
Hogya v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 122, 142 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1977); J. SuTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION§ 57.03, at 4!6 (4th ed. !973).
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California. As Justice Mosk pointed out in his dissent, section 1554 is
numbered compatibly with section 1554.1, which specifically addresses
the topic of warrants requisitioning the return of fugitives to California. 52 Furthermore, these two sections were once part ofthe same statute which stipulated that section 1554 referred solely to such
requisitioning warrants. 53 These factors, ignored by the .Brown court,
demonstrate that the evidence concerning the sequential import of the
statutory sections is, at best, conflicting. On the basis of this suspect
ground, the court nevertheless adopted an interpretation which prescribed the substitution, rather than the limitation, of statutory language.
The Brown court would have achieved a more satisfactory construction of the Extradition Act by resolving the Act's ambiguities in a
manner which comported more closely with accepted principles of statutory construction. As both commentators and courts have pointed
out, the power to construe mandatory language as discretionary is
"dangerously liable to abuse, and one which should be most carefully
guarded in its exercise." 54 The doctrine of restraint was well articulated by the Mississippi Supreme Court in an early case involving statutory construction:
This mode-of getting rid of a statutory provision by calling it directory
is not only unsatisfactory on account of the vagueness of the rule itself,
but it is the exercise of a dispensing ·power by the courts which approaches so near to legislative discretion that it ought to be resorted to
with reluctance, only in extraordinary cases, where great public mischief would otherwise ensue, or important private interests demand the
application of the rule. . . . It is dangerous to attempt to be wiser than
the law; and when its requirements are plain and positive, the courts
are not called upon to give reasons why it was enacted. A judge should
rarely take upon himself to say that what the legislature have required
is unnecessary. 55

Thus, the Brown court's objective should have been the articulation of
a construction which altered the language of the statute as little as possible. To that end, any of the implied limitations on sections 1548.3
and 1554 considered in Brown would have been preferable to the constructions ultimately adopted by the court.
A second principle of statutory construction mentioned but given
no weight by the Brown court is the rule that "[w]here both mandatory
and directory verbs are used in the same statute . . . it is a fair infer52. 20 Cal. 3d at 784, 576 P.2d at 485, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 770 (Mask, J., dissenting).
53. Id.
54. H. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE
§§ 150-151, at 533 (2d ed. 1911).
55. Koch v. Bridges, 45 Miss. 247, 258-59 (1871).
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ence that the legislature realized the difference in meaning, and intended that the verbs used should carry with them their ordinary
meanings." 56 The legislature applied both recognized mandatory language57 as well as recognized discretionary language 58 in the Extradition Act, thus strengthening the inference that the legislature used the
two divergent modes purposefully. Application of this principle to
Brown provides further support for the constructions of the Extradition
Act rejected by the court, which would have emphasized the
mandatory import of sections 1548.1 and 1549.2.
A third principle of statutory construction ignored by the Brown
court relates to the possible supremacy clause problems raised by the
court's definition of the gubernatorial duty as de jure discretionary. In
the same context, federal law has defined this duty as mandatory. 59
The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution dictates that in
cases of conflict, the federal provision controls and the conflicting state
legislation is rendered invalid. 60 The California Supreme Court as recently as 1976, in an opinion by Justice Richardson, admonished that
"courts have an obligation to construe statutes in a way as to avoid
serious constitutional doubts" in relation to the federal Constitution. 61
A related canon of construction states that courts should presume a
legislative intent to enact a constitutionally sound statute. 62 Justice
Richardson's opinion h1 Brown, however, has imputed to the legislature
of California an intent to contradict the ier:ms of the federal extradition
clause and its implementing legislation. Although the result reached in
Brown was framed as a function of state court enforcement authorization, the retention of mandatory characterizations of the gubernatorial
duty under sections 1548.1 and 1549.2 would have avoided potential
supremacy clause tensions, and therefore should have been adopted by
the court.
sum, the court in Brown has chosen, from among several alternatives, the construction which most severely strains the language of
the Extradition Act. Furthermore, it has selected the only construction
][n

In re H.ichard E., 21 Cal. 3d 349, 579 P.2d 495, !46 Cal. Rptr. qo4 {!978); J. SuTHERsupra note 51,§ 57.11, at 429 (4th ed. 1973).
57. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE § 1548.1 (West 1970) ("it is the duty of the Governor"); id.
§ !549.2 ("the Governor . . . shall sign a warrant of arrest").
58. See, e.g., id. §§ 1549, 1549.1 ("the Governor . . . may also surrender").
59. See cases cited at notes 6 & 7 supra.
60. U.S. CoNST. art. VI,§ 2. See Richardson v. State, 90 Idaho 566, 414 P.2d 871 (1966);
Application of Williams, 76 Idaho 173, 279 P.2d 882 (1955); People v. Bessenger, 273 App. Div.
19, 75 N.Y.S. 2d 392 (1947); Bailey v. Laurie, 373 A.2d 482 (R.I. 1977).
61. People v. Projection Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 56, 550 P.2d 600, 608, 130 Cal. Rptr.
328, 336 (1976).
62. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. v. Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 937, 479 P.2d 669, 92 Cal. Rptr.
309 (1971); J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 51,§ 45.11 (4th ed. 1973).
56.

LAND,
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which requires the imputation of legislative intent to contradict federal
law. In doing so, the court has violated established principles of statutory construction while failing to adequately substantiate the construction adopted.
IV
STATUTORY MISINTERPRETATION AND THE BROWN COURT

A.

Judicial Authority: The Enforcement of Mandatory Gubernatorial
.Duties.

The majority in Brown was analytically ambivalent in proceeding
to its desired result. The court initially accepted the traditionally established mandatory characterization of the gubernatorial extradition
duty. 63 Toward the end of the opinion, however, the court argued that
the legislature intended to create a discretionary duty. 64 The resulting
inconsistency suggests more fundamental fallacies in the court's approach to the enforcement question than the errors of statutory construction and treatment of precedent previously discussed in this Note.
The primary fallacy-which becomes apparent upon examination of
California case law prior to Brown-lies in the court's failure to address adequately the constitutional dimension of the enforcement issue.
Rather, the court, without discussion, chose to frame the issue solely in
terms of statutory interpretation of the Extradition Act.
The primary obstacles in the court's path to denying the writ
sought by South Dakota were two-fold: the traditional characterization
of the extradition duty as mandatory unde:t;" both federal and California
law, 65 and the California rule that mandatory gubernatorial duties are
enforceable by writ of mandamus. 66 The Brown court handled the
characterization problem by adhering to the mandatory label in some
parts of the opinion, while treating the duty elsewhere in the opinion as
discretionary and simply ignoring the problems raised by the discretionary definition.
The court skirted traditional notions of the enforceability of
mandatory gubernatorial duties by developing a distinction between
enforceable and unenforceable mandatory duties. In concluding that
the governor's extradition duty was an unenforceable mandatory duty,
the court relied almost exclusively on the absence of any legislative intent in the Extradition Act to authorize judicial enforcement. It ignored the line of California authorities that have established that the
63.
64.
65.
66.

See notes 35 & 37 supra.
20 Cal. 3d at 774-77, 576 P.2d at 479-81, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 764-66.
See cases cited in notes 6 & 7 supra.
See cases cited in note 78 i'!fra.
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enfmceability of mandatory duties is derived not from the legislative
intent concerning the proper role of the courts, but rather from the constitutionally prescribed role of the court in relation to the executive
branch.
The court's approach revealed a rnisperception of the customary
significance of the statute sought to be enforced in California cases analyzing the issue of judicial enforcement. This confusion stemmedc in
part from the court's failure adequately to distinguish the distinct questions of judicial authority and executive duty posed in cases like Brown.
In resolving such enforcement questions, the court normally seeks to
discern a statutory definition of the obligation that the legislature intended to impose on the executive. 67 lln pursuing this task, interpretation of the statute creating the executive duty is quite logically a
primary focus of judicial inquiry. The nature ofthe duty, once defined,
is critical in the court's enforcement determination: mandatory or ministerial duties are traditionally held enforceable in California, while
discretionary duties are not. 68 The source of the court's authority to
enforce mandatory duties, however, is the principle of supremacy of
law inherent in the constitutional framework of California government.69 H has not been found to depend on the legislature showing an
intent that a mandatory duty be enforced by writ of mandamus. 70
B.

McCauley v. JBrooks: Separation of Powers and the Enforcement
Issue

An early California case, often cited as authority for executive
amenability to mandamus, fully explores the separation of powers dimension of the enforcement issue. In JWcCauley v. Brooks/ 1 the court's
analysis of judicial authority to issue a writ of mandamus to the executive branch emphasized the California Consiiiution's provision for a
separation of state governmental powers. 72 This principle of separa67. See, e.g., Hollman v. Warren, 32 Cal. 2d 351, 196 P.2d 562 (1948); Stuart v. Haight, 39
Cal. 87 (!870); Middleton v. Low, 30 Cal. 596 (1866).
68. Jenlcins v. Knight, 46 Cal. 2d 220,293 P.2d 6 (1956); Elliott v. Pardee, 149 Cal. 516, 86 P.
!087 (1906); Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal. !89 (!870).
69. Jenlcins v. Knight, 46 Cal. 2d 220, 293 P.2d 6 (1956); McCauley v. Brooks, 16 Cal. II
(1860). California cases have consistently based their holdings of gubernatorial amenability to
writ of mandamus "on the fundamental principle that under our system of government no man is
above the law." 46 Cal. 2d at 223, 293 P.2d at 8 (1956).
70. Cases holding that the governor is amenable to writ of mandamus do not refer to legislative intent in regard to the statute to be enforced as a source of enforcement authorization. See,
e.g., Jenkins v. Knight, 46 Cal. 2d 220,293 P.2d 6 (1956); Hollman v. Warren, 32 Cal. 2d 351, 196
P.2d 562 (1948); Elliott v. Pardee, 149 Cal. 516, 86 P. 1087 (1906); Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal.
189 (1870); Stuart v. Haight, 39 Cal. 87 (1870); Middleton v. Low, 30 Cal. 596 (1866).
71. 16 Cal. 11 (1860).
72. .!d. at 39-47. The California Constitution presently provides for division of the powers of
the state government in CAL. CoNST. art. HI, § 3.
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tion,-however, was found by the court to be limited by the coordinate
principle that no officer of the government is above the law. 73 In short,
the principle of separation was seen as one of restricted rather than
·absolute independence of governmental branches. Though the McCauley case itself concerned issuance of a writ of mandamus to the
state controller, the court addressed the governor's role in dictum. In
matters involving discretion, the court said the governor "is independent of the other departments," 74 while in nondiscretionary areas, he "is
subject, like every other citizen, to the law" 75 and hence may be compelled to act by the judi~?ial branch through the writ ofmandamus. 76 In
supporting his analysis, Chief Justice Field relied upon other cases
which were equally explicit in grounding court enforcement of
mandatory gubernatorial duties in a constitutionally based notion of
restricted separation of powers. 77
Since McCauley, a number of California cases-none of which
were distinguished or even discussed by the majority in .Brown-have
held what McCauley stated in dictum, that the governor may be subject
to a writ ofmandamus. 78 Some of these cases make explicit the constitutional basis for their holdings 79 and .regularly refer to McCauley as
authority, thus implicitly reaffirming Chief Justice Field's supremacy of
law and separation of powers reasoning. 80 In many cases, however,
courts proceed directly from statutory interpretation for the purpose of
defining the executive duty to a conclusion on enforcement. 81 The constitutiomiJ step has become so well established that the analysis is often
truncated, and the constitutional basis not explicitly stated; Perhaps
this is one explanation for the confusion exhibited by the majority of
the .Brown court.
Thus, the .Brown court is unique not only in its reference to the
Extradition Act as a source of enforcement authorization, but also in its
failure to consider other sources. The first of these innovations seems
merely misguided. The second, however-ignoring a source of en73. 16 Cal. at 41.
74. Id. at 40.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 41.
77. E.g., Whiteman v. Chase, 5 Ohio St. 528 (1856) (cited in the McCauley opinion as State
v. The Governor of Ohio).
78. Jenkins v. Knight, 46 Cal. 2d 220,293 P.2d 6 (1956); Hollman v. Warren, 32 Cal. 2d 351,
196 P.2d 562 (1948); Elliott v. Pardee, 149 Cal. 516, 86 P. 1087 (1906); Harpending v. Haight, 39
Cal. 189 (1870); Stuart v. Haight, 39 Cal. 87 (1870).
79. Jenkins v. Knight, 46 Cal. 2d 220, 293 P.2d 6 (1956); Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal. 189
(1870).
80. Jenkins v. Knight, 46 Cal. 2d 220, 223, 293 P.2d 6, 8 (1956); Hollman v. Warren, 32 Cal.
2d 351, 354, 196 P.2d 562, 564 (1948); Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal. 189, 210 (1870).
81. E.g., Stuart v. Haight, 39 Cal. 87 (1870).
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forcement authorization that has been highlighted in a continuous 1lne
of cases since JlfcCau!ejl-re.fl.ects a significant lack of candor on the
court's part. 'Jhe opinion suggests a judicial sleight of hand that is
compounded by the majority's failure to acknowledge its substantial
departure from established California precedent. ][n essence, the.Brown
court has carved out exceptions to both the sphere of court power delineated in the JlfcCaulq line of cases and the court's constitutionally
granted mandamus jurisdiction. In doing so, it examined neither the
pertinent cases nor the relevant constitutional provisions.

C

.rrom Legislative Silence to Legislative Intent: The Unreasonable
I'!ference in Brown

Another substantial weakness in the Brown opinion is the court's
w.J.reasonable reliance upon legislative silence in discerning legislative.
82
intent. 'Ihe court implicitly deferred to a presumed legislative definition of the appropriate balance of power between the judiciary and the
executive in extradition matters. But the Brown majority failed to identify any evidence in either the Extradition Act itself or its legislative
history that indicates that the legislature intended to address the issue
of court enforcement in the Act. Quite simply, there is no such evidence. 'Io the contrary, as argued above, a close reading of Jlfanchester
and Dennison demonstrates that those cases did not necessitate any response from the legislature. 83 The court nevertheless pe1·severed in
seeking such an intent and consequently was compelled! to place undue
significance upon legislative silence in its ill-conceived! statutory a~aly
sis.
Reliance on legislative silence as a source of legislative intent has
been characterized by a number of courts and cowmentato:rs as a highly suspect instrument of statutory construction and application. 84 ]Legislative failure to address an issue in explicit terms is susceptible to a
number of inconsistent Inferences. Given the vagaries ofthe legislative
process, the legislature may well have been unaware of the problem or
too preoccupied with other areas of lawmaking to formulate a policy
on the issue. 85 Alternatively, the legislature may have purposefully deferred to judicial resolution, or may have desired for any number of
reasons to leave the matter unresolved. 86 'Jhe Brown court provided no
82. 20 Cal. 3d at 771-74, 576 P.2d at 477-79, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 762-64.
83. See text accompanying notes 13-36 supra.
84. Girouard V. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69, 70 (1946); R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 181-83 (1975); J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 51,§ 49.10.
85. R. DICKERSON, supra note 84, at 181.
86. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 70 (1946).
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grounds for elim1nating any of these potential contrary inferences in
relation to the Extradition Act.
The court's reliance on legislative silence is particularly inappropriate in Brown in light of the nature of the subject under consideration. In an issue 'Of constitutional stature, it is unlikely that the
legislature would. have. elected to determine the judicial-executive balance of power in extradition matters by implication rather than by express pronouncement on the subject. Rather, the fact that in the past
the court has delineated the constitutionally prescribed balance of
power in the area of judicial enforcement against the chief executiveas the McCauley line of cases ainply demonstrates-strongly supports
the argument that the legislative failure to speak manifested deference
in favor of judicial resolution of the question, thus allowing the court to
continue in its well-established role.
CONCLUSION

The California· Supreme Court's primary errors of commission in
South .Dakota v. Brown were two-fold. First, the court relied in its reasoning on unsound readings of both the .Dennison and Manchester
cases. Second, the court's statutory analysis of the Extradition Act
manifested a manipulative use of the silence of successive California
legislatures that enacted the succeeding versions of the state's extradition legislation. The court's primary error of omission was its failure to
explore the c<mstitutional separation of powers issue raised by the
court's holding. As a result of these deficiencies, the Brown court's
opinion exhibits both analytical ambivalence and reasoning that
strained to support the result reached by the court. As the court's first
attempt to deal directly with court enforcement of the California governor's duty to extradite a convicted felon and fugitive from a sister state,
the opinion provides neither a candid nor convincing rationale for the
unenforceability of the gubernatorial duty.
Kevin C McMunigal*
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